James Hasik

Military-Industrial Mismatch: Battlefield and Business Learning Rates

My long research note of 25 August, “On Learning Lessons from the Russo-Ukrainian War,” analyzed the debate on how much seems to have changed of late about the character of warfare. For the military, at least two things differ: drones and data. I now extend that analysis to industry, where the issue includes customary rates of development and production. In today’s Wall Street Journal, Yaroslav Trofimov brings two quotes from top military management that encapsulate the dichotomous learning problem:

Nothing stands firm. War is the time when technology develops. Every operation is different, and if you repeat it the same way, it would make no sense because the enemy already has an antidote.

— Vice Admiral Oleksiy Neizhpapa, commander of the Ukrainian Navy

We have a lot of lessons to learn. One is that quantity is a quality of its own. You need numbers, you need force numbers. In the West we have reduced our military, we have reduced our stocks. But quantity matters, mass matters.

— Major General Christian Freuding, the head of Ukraine operations at the German Ministry of Defense

In short, we will need new stuff, constantly, and a lot of it. So how well is this present lesson being learned? My three-page research note offers ideas: Download Military-Industial Mismatch Battlefield and Business Learning 20230928.

Restructuring security assistance around services and software?

American security assistance has long resisted substantially on training and weapons. The training does not always stick, and for Ukrainians more recently, the advice has been unhelpful. The weapons are mostly highly valued, in comparison to those of Russia and China, though not always well suited to local conditions. After reading Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds’ latest report at RUSI, I offer two ideas for moving security assistance from advice and hardware to services and software. For my full-page, full-bore analysis, Download Security assistance services and software 20230925.

Munitions Mobilized; Next, Do Drones.

I disagree with Josh Rogin’s editorial, in yesterday’s Washington Post, that “Ukraine aid is hanging by a thread.” In contrast, I agree with Byron Callan of Capital Alpha Partners for his observation, in a research note of yesterday, that money and munitions will continue flowing to support the war in the east, “because a majority in DC recognizes the consequences of a Ukrainian defeat for Asia and Europe.” Whatever the fulminations of what Congressman Don Bacon of Nebraska has termed “the dysfunction caucus”, there are far better costs to cut, including in the Defense Department’s budget. Thus, as Callan continues in a research note of earlier today, the current war will remain contest of industries, at which the Russians will struggle in the long run. As Pavel Baev wrote this week, “the old Soviet stocks are exhausted, and current production rates are insufficient.”

I will continue with a further thought. The next big war may be yet more a contest of militaries, and before it starts. Mobilizing old-school munitions production may not suffice. Forces across and beyond NATO need to get more comfortable with unmanned systems, and the marketing arms of the arms industry have a role to play in that.

For my full five-page analysis, including the charts, Download Munitions Mobilized Next Do Drones 20230922.

On Winning a War at Sea, without Ships: Some thinking, on the Ukrainian-not-Navy, Elon Musk, and the potential for naval automation.

September has seemed a pivotal month in the conduct of modern warfare, even if we just focus on the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War. In considering the score of the past two weeks, note that all the Ukrainian work to secure the Black Sea against Russian naval activity has been undertaken without access to a single large ship. The Russians have lost a submarine, but only in port. For many navies, this begs the question, when does a navy actually require surface ships? What radical change would that suggest? In my seven-page note, I analyze that question through the framework of what Elon Musk calls his “algorithm” for breakthrough performance improvement.

Download On Winning at Sea without Ships 20230919.

Fighting, Ukrainian Style: The Pentagon’s Replicator Initiative points to pending change in military organizations and industrial advantage.

The recent crash of a Russian warlord’s airplane is a reminder of the ubiquity of overhead surveillance: American intelligence thinks that the cause must have been an onboard bomb, because no missile launch was detected near Moscow. The full scope of that sort of overhead surveillance has enabled a Ukrainian style of warfare that relies heavily on highly dispersed, mobile infantry splendidly equipped with precision robotics. The Pentagon’s Replicator Initiative aims to duplicate some of that for the Americans, though perhaps with more robust and survivable weapons. Reforming fighting forces like 21st-century “Jock Columns” demands precision technology en masse, which suggests quicker program starts, faster learning curves, a shift in comparative advantage in military contracting, and less enthusiasm for horizontal mergers.

Read my four-page analysis here: Download On Fighting Ukrainian Style 20230829.

On Learning Lessons from the Russo-Ukrainian War: Moving militaries into the 21st Century may require alliances for marketing and manufacturing.

Anonymous opinions about the situation in the Russo-Ukrainian War have been characterizing the military situation as stalemated. I assess that this whisper campaign is more designed to justify political decisions by the Biden Administration than to assess both the tactical situation and the broader technological dynamics of modern warfare. A more honest debate about what is possible and plausible in modern warfare, underway for several years, has been greatly informed by feedback from the front. Many 20th-century military systems are showing obsolescence because 21st-century surveillance and strike systems have been limiting their battlefield potential, inflicting high losses for little countervailing value. This in turn has been exposing the high costs and long production lead-times of the old-and-obvious.

The question for technologists and industrialists is whether the strategists will learn the relevant lessons, and how soon. The 21st century will unfold more slowly than some pundits predict, but more quickly than conservative military sentiments will allow. Fixing that problem will require vigorous marketing, and judicious timing in scaling manufacturing. Corporate alliances between emerging and established firms continue to offer an excellent way to solve that problem, and sometimes as far forward as Ukraine.

My full seven-page analysis is available here: Download On Learning Lessons from the Russo-Ukrainian War 20230825.