James Hasik

On Investing in Ukrainian Software: Open an office in Kyiv, but focus on the non-kinetic.

A series of essays over the past few weeks, from leading technologists and industrialists, have led me to four points about the meaning of software in modern warfare:

1. Software has been eating the world, and as the Russo-Ukrainian War shows, it is now eating the war.
2. Software is different, and military bureaucracies in much of the world are still struggling with that reality.
3. The Ukrainians now know military software like no one else in the world.
4. In the long run, the Ukrainians will rule much of this business, so industry in North American and the rest of Europe should start working with them now. The two easy answers are to open an office in Kyiv, but for now, to focus on non-kinetic applications.

Download my full six-page analysis at the link: Download On Investing in Ukrainian Software 20230712.

On the Military, Demography, and Human Capital: Responding to the rolling disaster requires reserves, robotics, rethinking strategies, and refinancing contracting.

Across the Atlantic alliance, and indeed in most industrialized countries, demography is producing long-term disaster for the military. In many of those countries, questionable human capital management is exacerbating the problem. I suggest a four-fold response:

• greater reliance on reserves,
• increased use of battlefield and rear-area robotics,
• rethinking strategies for more valuable utilization of people, and
• refinancing contracting by leveraging investments in labor-extending technologies.

My full seven-page analysis is available here: Download On the Military Demography & Human Capital 20230706.

On Brilliant Munitions: Defense ministries and industries must prepare for the next war with a full embrace of autonomous technologies.

Multiple challenges demand that allied military forces embrace a host of emerging technologies for radically expanded autonomy in weaponry. I have five points:

Economy. The competing Russian and Ukrainian ways of war are again revealing the compelling case for precision in all weapon systems.

Geography. In the future, against modern surveillance and strike technologies, allied forces will fight with difficulty through even thin opposing lines, and at great distances, with their logistics constantly under attack.

Demography. Very low birth rates in almost every allied country will provide fewer forces for defense and counter-attack against smash-and-grab autocrats. Maneuver under modern conditions may be very difficult, but still necessary.

Technology. All this means that future wars will thus require substituting capital for labor: collaborative, loitering, self-guided weapons with heterogenous payloads accompanying all the troops. This requires rediscovering and updating the old American Way of War: industrial-scale attrition, with information-age technologies.

Industry. Development and production of weapons with these technologies may require upstart firms and collaborative alliances. Building precision with mass will certainly mean more production capacity. Investments are flowing, and with a strong demand signal.

Firms mentioned in this note include Adarga, Anduril and its acquisition Adranos, BAE Systems Bofors, General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, MBDA, Nammo, Northrop Grumman, and RTX’s Raytheon.

Download my full eight-page analysis at the link: Download On Brilliant Munitions 20230629.

On the Russo-Ukrainian War: Slightly increased likelihood of near-term war termination, but still with long-term hostility from Russia.

After the events of the past week, I update my ongoing analysis of the conduct of the Russo-Ukrainian War. I upwardly revise my assessment of war termination in the next six months from highly unlikely to merely unlikely. I have four points:

• The “Joyride of the Valkyries” undertaken by the Wagner Group has revealed a complete lack of Russian military reserves.
• This increases the likelihood of a dramatic Ukrainian exploitation, if Ukrainian forces can penetrate Russian defensive lines.
• Industry outside Ukraine continues to learn from Ukrainian experience, slowly.
• Investors should expect investment horizons supported by long-term Russian hostility.

I also offer some insights from this week’s Land Warfare Conference at the Royal United Services Institute in London. I will continue to update my analysis as events warrant. Download my full four-page analysis at the link below:

Download On the Russo-Ukrainian War 20230627

On Drones and the Paris Air Show: Mounting military experience points to armies of drones and industries of many.

News flow from this week’s Paris Air Show, and my ongoing research and analysis, lead me to four main points about drones:

• Mounting combat experience indicates that military spending on unmanned aircraft will increase sharply.
• The diversity of drone builders showcased indicates an ongoing Hyundaization of the military aircraft industry.
• Policy-makers should realize that wartime mobilization will necessarily favor unmanned over manned aircraft, because the latter cannot be built quickly.
• Investors and industrialists should anticipate that even without a big war, the rise of drone makers may quicken.

Firms mentioned in this report include Atlas (Latvia), Baykar, Boeing, Elbit, Eurofighter GmbH, General Atomics, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, MBDA, Northrop Grumman, Saab, Sierra Nevada, Tekever (Portugal), Turgis & Gaillard (France), and Ukroboronprom.

Download my full eight-page analysis through the link below:

Download On Drones and the Paris Air Show 20230623

Further Thoughts on Battlefield Rotorcraft: Russian and other demonstrations of standoff weapons on helicopters suggest a future for attack tilt-rotors.

Developments over the past few weeks have reinforced my views about the future of battlefield air support. I have four points:

• The Russian Army’s helicopter force continues to suffer high casualty rates in Ukraine, which indicates that direct attack against sophisticated air defenses is very challenging.
• However, recent reinforcement of the helicopter force in Berdyansk, mostly out of Ukrainian missile range, with its own standoff missiles, indicates that the Russian Army is learning from past failures.
• The Italian Army has already pursued this standoff weapons approach, and the US Army is close behind. 
• However, a full analysis of alternatives for the US Army’s Future Attack and Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) could produce a very different result than presumed.

The result is that technologists, industrialists, and investors should consider a future in which tilt-rotors are more important to combat aviation than conventional helicopters, and perhaps other types of aircraft as well. 

Firms mentioned in this report include Bell, Boeing, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Rafael, Russian Helicopters, Sikorsky, and Thales.

Download my full four-page analysis through the link below:

Download Further thoughts on battlefield rotorcraft 20230620