NATO’s newest unbeloved state is not Turkey, nor Hungary, but presumably transatlantic stalwart Germany. The dispute early this year over the reexport of German-built Leopard 2 tanks from Poland and other countries to Ukraine pitted almost the entire alliance against one of its once-key members. More exposed Poland, having none of German reticence, threatened to break its contractual agreement with Germany, and send its tanks on, permission or not. What then might be the consequences to Poland of unilateral action? The deal might have been done more readily than imagined, with two the ultimate winners beyond NATO: Ukraine, of course, but also South Korea, Poland’s up-and-coming arms supplier of choice.
Ukraine had been requesting tanks, and specifically the German-built Leopard 2s, since at least 3 March 2022—one week after Russia’s utterly unjustified aggression began. The well-regarded Leopard is practically a NATO standard: armies across the alliance have about 2,000 all told. The Polish Army alone has about 250 of those. By January 2023, Poland, Finland, Denmark, and Spain had each offered to send a company-set of fourteen to Ukraine, which would form a battalion-set of 56 (assuming that the Ukrainians wanted to form a larger battalion, as most NATO member-state armies do). The United States was separately sending 59 late-model Bradley tank-hunting troop carriers and 18 Paladin armored, mobile howitzers. Other NATO countries hadalready sent Paladins, and mobile cannons of rather longer range. With such modern tanks, troop carriers, and howitzers, the Ukrainian Army could equip another mechanized brigade, and one with much better technology than anything the Russian Army could bring.
The problem was the tanks. The German government was continuing to deny permission to reexport the vehicles outside the alliance. Reexport restrictions are a common feature of international arms transfers, if only to prevent dodgy customers from selling on one’s guns to even dodgier customers. The Germans were offering a “you first” condition—the Leopards could go if the Americans consented to sending their comparably modern Abrams tanks. The US Defense Department had for some time protested that the Abrams would not be helpful, as their turbine engines consume too much fuel, and as the vehicles overall require too much maintenance. In conversations with American lawmakers, German Chancellor Olaf Shultz claimed concern that Germany lacks America’s nuclear deterrent, and feared targeting in some forthcoming Russian attack. If America moved first, somehow his fears would dissipate. This continues to seem an odd excuse, as nuclear-armed Britain had already announced that it would be sending fourteen of its more-or-less contemporaneous Challenger 2 tanks. Meanwhile, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are demanding German action, having already sent a disproportionate fraction of their own small arsenals to Ukraine.
The American protest that its own tanks were something of gas-guzzling hangar queens seemed an alarming admission. The Poles themselves seemed less concerned, having ordered Abrams recently in two tranches. In 2022, Poland agreed to buy 250 M1A2 Abrams tanks, for $4.7 billion, to be delivered after upgrades in 2025 and 2026. (Note that this number neatly replaces Poland’s Leopards.) In January 2023, Poland agreed to buy 116 older M1A1 Abrams tanks, for $1.4 billion, for delivery later this year. Presumably this later order of older tanks to be delivered sooner will be sourced from the M1A1 fleet declared surplus a few years ago in the reorganization of the US Marine Corps as a more naval force. Separately, in July 2022, Poland signed an agreement with South Korea to buy as many as 1,000 new K2 Black Panther tanks. These were already arriving this past January, and fully 180 should arrive by 2025. Lighter than the Abrams and diesel-powered, the K2s are rather more fuel efficient, and perhaps easier to maintain.
All this said, regarding Leopards, Polish Prime Minister Matuesz Morawiecki had stated that “consent is a secondary issue.” His government, he said in January, would “either get this agreement quickly,” or “do the right thing ourselves.” The Poles believed that international law is on their side, under the principle of rebus sic stantibus (things thus standing -- agreements should hold as long as the conditions presumed by the agreements hold. When those things change greatly, so too must the agreements. The right thing, most plainly, was to get Kyiv the weapons it needed (and still needs) to force the Russian Army out of Ukraine. Shortly thereafter, Polish Defense Minister Mariusz Blaszczak announced that Ukrainian troops would soon start training on Poland’s Leopards, German permission or not. As we all now recall, German permission proceeded quickly.
But how advisable for Poland would have been breaking that contract? From the Polish perspective (or that of any other country considering violating a reexport agreement), we can think about the problem in terms of timing and geography. In the short run, tanks must be sustained, both in Ukraine (the secondary importing country) and in Poland (the reexporting country). In the long run, tanks may be procured again, from Germany (the originally exporting country) or some other country—if not actually produced domestically. This framework leads to at least five questions:
Could fourteen formerly Polish Leopards be sustained in Ukraine? Assume that the German government had taken a harsh stand on the reexport, and suspended delivery of spares to Poland (and of course, Ukraine). If Poland were really only sending a company-set, Polish warehouses built for 250 Leopards could readily sustain fourteen forward for a long time.
Could Poland sustain its full fleet of Leopards? The bigger question is what would have happened to the readiness of the remaining Polish Leopards. The preceding strategy of focusing supplies on a small contingent would not work for the Polish Army, or any army, as a whole. However, if Abrams and Black Panthers arrived fast enough, this may not have mattered, as tanks from America and South Korea replaced those from Germany. This would have depended, of course, on American or South Korean indulgence about Polish contract-breaking—and more on that below. Regardless, to a great extent, sending Polish tanks forward in Ukrainian hands would mean fewer Russian tanks to vex Poland later. Polish sustainment would have declining necessity as Ukrainians continued to wear down Russians.
Next, what if Poland decided to send all its Leopards forward? Could Poland and like-minded countries have reverse-engineered enough parts for the tanks to keep their fleets rolling in Ukraine and elsewhere? The task would have been challenging, as modern automotive technologies roll with tens of thousands of parts. But consider some antecedents. In the early 1980s, through the “Flint River Project,” an industrial consortium in Michigan worked to find ways to upgrade Egypt’s large fleet of obsolescent Soviet tanks, once Egypt had turned west for support. The effort made good progress until the export of M1A1 Abrams kits to Egypt obviated further interest. Recall also recent Russian success in upgrading old Soviet-designed tanks with Western electronics—at least until trade sanctions interrupted much of the flow of supplies. And somehow, Iran still manages to fly some of its F-14s—more than four decades after the US cut off the flow of parts.
Could Poland again have imported tanks from Germany? Simply put, who cares? At some point, even with more than 1,300 tanks optioned and on order, Poland might want yet more tanks. Maybe. In that case, the possibility of a lasting German grudge might be considered. But at that point, who would want German tanks? Politically, not Poland, under this government, as the ruling Law & Justice Party has been making a practice of politically baiting Germany. More practically, few others. Should Germany have failed to summon the will to do the right thing, when reexport was so necessary, would have suggested that Germany would fail again. Germany would then have general troubles exporting arms in the future. After all, import customers buy weapons for at least three reasons: perceptions of technical performance, political connections to the exporting state, and the military example of an armed force that employs them successfully. The Leopard 2 addresses the first factor, but on the latter two Germany is lacking. Even now, no one should soon expect vigorous German support in wartime, and the Bundeswehr has become a bad joke amongst Europe’s armies.
Could Poland have imported tanks from elsewhere? On this side of the Atlantic, the US government does tend to obsess about third-party transfers, with its intrusive “Blue Lantern” inspection regime of allies and their bases. At the time, the US was publicly saying nothing averse about those pending Abrams in the context of a reexport of Leopards. However, should a future American administration hold this against Poland broadly, continued imports or even co-production with South Korea would be a logical possibility. Russia supports South Korea's sworn enemy to the north, and South Korea harbors no illusions about its ability or interest in fine-tuning a balance of power on the other side of the world. The emerging attention of the global markets to South Korea’s often excellent and affordable products has been termed the ‘Hyundaization’ of the international arms industry. For Poland, South Korea could be a most welcome friend. Russo-Ukrainian War may or may not be over by 2025 or 2026, but barring either revolution or collapse in Russia by 2026, the threat from the east will remain.
Could Poland produce its own tanks? This is no easy task. The last domestic concept for a Polish tank was the PL-01, in which the Obrum division of PGZ (Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa, “Polish Armaments Group”) teamed with BAE Systems Hägglunds of Sweden, to propose a lightweight tank with a heavy gun in a remote turret. That project lasted only from 2013 to 2015, when the costs of development of even a derivative product become apparent. (I gave a talk on the subject at the British Embassy in Warsaw back in 2014.) Nonetheless, the Polish armaments industry is very capable, money is flowing, and comparative self-reliance (albeit short of illusions of autarky) has become more interesting on both sides of the Atlantic.
These are the questions that the Polish prime minister’s office may very well have been asking of the defense ministry, and that the defense ministry should have been and likely was asking of the army and industry. What it was not asking, and indeed need not have asked, is about the right thing. Warsaw did not telephone Moscow about sending Polish T-72s to Kyiv. At that point, it did not need similar input on Leopards from Berlin. Rebus sic stantibus, indeed.
References
William Nattress, “Poland Emerges as Europe’s Leader Against Russia’s War in Ukraine,” Wall Street Journal, 20 January 2023. https://www.wsj.com/articles/poland-emerges-as-europes-leader-against-russias-war-in-ukraine-invasion-support-weapons-tanks-germany-11674248580.
Bojan Pancevski and Bertrand Benoit, “ Why Germany is Reluctant to Send Tanks to Ukraine,” Wall Street Journal, 20 January 2023. https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-germany-fears-sending-tanks-to-ukraine-11674225552.
Remarks by British Foreign Secretary James Cleverly at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 17 January 2023. https://www.csis.org/events/conversation-uk-foreign-secretary-james-cleverly.
“Poland signs deal to buy 2nd batch of U.S. Abrams tanks,” Associated Press, 4 January 2023. https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/poland-signs-deal-buy-2nd-batch-us-abrams-96177548.
Jakub Palowski, “K9A1 Howitzers and K2 Main Battle Tanks Delivered to Poland,” Defence24.com, 12 June 2022. https://defence24.com/armed-forces/k9a1-howitzers-and-k2-main-battle-tanks-delivered-to-poland.
Ian Lovett and Evan Gershkovich, “Pressure Builds on Germany to Approve Tanks for Ukraine,” Wall Street Journal, 21 January 2023. https://www.wsj.com/articles/pressure-builds-on-germany-to-approve-tanks-for-ukraine-11674297917.
Joe Katzman, “The ‘Hyundaization’ of the Global Arms Industry,” Wall Street Journal, 5 April 2015. https://www.wsj.com/articles/joe-katzman-the-hyundaization-of-the-global-arms-industry-1428271215.
James Byrne et al., Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine, Royal United Services Institution, August 2022. https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/silicon-lifeline-western-electronics-heart-russias-war-machine.
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