The recent naval campaigns on the Black Sea, between the Russian Navy and Ukraine's now "Anti-Navy" have led me to look at how recent results fit into historical patterns. I offer the linked working paper, "On Navies, Anti-Navies, and the Limits of Sea Power." Here is my abstract:
Since the development of precision-guided weapons in the last century, there have been ten cases, across six wars, of anti-ship missile attacks on ships defended by their own missile systems. In five cases, the defenders did not fire or fire in time for effective defense, and a targeted ship was hit. In four of those five cases, the ship was heavily damaged or sunk, by just one or two missiles. All of these attacks were launched by “anti-navies”: poorly regarded attackers firing cruise missiles from land-based aircraft or trucks. This historical record has recently been reinforced by the experience of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, effectively chased from half its operating area, by Ukrainians bereft of their own ships afloat. All this suggests that hostile coastlines are dangerous, that the detection of inbound strikes is the foremost problem for defensibility on the surface, and that even large warships can be readily rendered combat ineffective. Worse, rapidly improving surveillance technologies are making hiding on the surface of the ocean very difficult. The strategic implication of these anti-navies is that surface warships are less useful in combat than assumed. In response, fleet architectures should emphasize smaller, more numerous surface ships; that can hide in plain sight; supported by organic, autonomous surveillance.
My objective is to inform debate on how the purpose of navies and the design of their warships need to change.I will be delighted for comments, though I ask that it not be cited until I have had ample time for revisions. I am sure that this will benefit from some expert advice.
Comments