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28 October 2013


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The shift did give OC the $50M E-coating facility they didn't have. But, in the end, the relative weak position that the USG is in, given their financial quagmire, doesn't actually help them get a cheaper truck. The field of competitors is quickly thinning. LMC will drop out if the margin is historically low, like in the single digit (after being negative initially) range like the FMTV. Navistar is no longer a consideration. AMG, well, still is AMG, and that doesn't make them a factor. Who is left?

I might remind you that OC did threaten to sue when the S&S board took a low offer from AH. OC had a chance to run Sealy their way, if they were given the opportunity to buy the Division. OC, as desperate as a drowning cat, was that winner. The Army still overpaid by 30% for 75% of the fleet.
Sadly, Oshkosh had a better ride available 10 years ago. With independent suspension. For less money. The Marines got it, and they are about 3-4 decades ahead of the Army....
So now they are stuck with that hard axle, non-updated chassis. That can't be retrofit to IS cheaply.
Welcome to the next M35, boys. They will be in service until at 2040. Brilliant.

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  • James Hasik is a senior fellow at the Center for Government Contracting in the School of Business at George Mason University, and a senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center on Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. Since September 2001, he has been studying global security challenges and the economic enterprises that provide the tools to address them.


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