The marketing challenges of OEMs and others in the AMPV competition

I was asked the other day, after Navistar's on-again, off-again protest of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) Engineering & Manufacturing Development (EMD) contract awards, whether I thought that the US Army and Marine Corps might eventually split their buys. Going unjoint might defuse an eventual political spat over a single big award, and the Marines really don't want a vehicle that precisely matches the Army's requirements anyway. It's rather understandable that they need something lighter yet for ship-to-shore assaults. I had to admit that the scenario seemed plausible, but even with all that in mind, the JLTV is not the most likely split buy I foresee.

Rather, I take a strong hint from the briefing materials and announcements emanating from the Army's Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) program office. The AMPV is supposed to replace at least 3,000 M113s, and perhaps as many as 5,000 M113s, in a variety of roles, in both mechanized brigades and higher-echeloned support units. Until this summer, the solution was presumed to be a single vehicle type, though of vague description. Pending completion of an analysis of alternatives (AoA), even whether it would be wheeled or tracked was up for grabs (if this reminds anyone of the Future Combat System program, hold snickers until the end).

But in June, an AMPV official invited interested AMPV bidders to Warren, Michigan to view five vehicles that might help them eventually bid on the EMD program The Army, that is, wants to skip the customary Technology Demonstration (TD) phase, as building a new utility armored vehicle isn't quite a science project (it's an engineering problem). Those five come-and-see vehicles were

— an M113A3 armored personnel carrier (APC),
— an M1064A3, which is what the Army calls the latest version of the M113 configured as a 120 mm mortar carrier,
— an M1068A3 command post vehicle (again, an M113),
— an M557 command post vehicle (the "High Top Shoe", which looks like a conversion van approach to the M113), and
— a turretless Bradley, of M2A2 ODS (post-"Operation Desert Storm" upgrade) stock.

Now, in case anyone wasn't watching, I'll describe what this means in terms of the US Army's Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV) competition back in 2000. In the aftermath of the Army's relative non-involvement in the Kosovo Campaign, General Eric Shinseki, who was then chief of staff, made clear that he did not often buy new armored vehicles, but when he did, he preferred one with eight wheels. At least one contractor, the old United Defense LP, missed that somehow, and bid a refurbished and upgraded M113. Whatever the merits of UDLP's approach, the customer's signal was unmistakable.

What was UDLP is now part of BAE Systems in the US, and this time the table is somewhat turned (see below), for it is that company's vehicle getting the strong nod. It's easy to understand why. As the Fulda Gap scenario fades into distant memory, the Army now finds itself with an excess stock of at least 3,000 Bradleys. Some digital upgrades and welding torch work on them would be a lot cheaper than buying wholly new vehicles.

Wholly new, though, is what General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) has in mind—new Strykers, that is, from the advertised-as-hot production line in Ontario. In other circumstances, that would be brilliant, as the Army is but one of a dozen or so land forces that have had a good experience with the LAV-III over the past decade or so. That Bradley inventory and the decaying state of federal finances, however, are not likely to support acquisition of another 3,000 Strykers. With JLTV and the really expensive Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) competing for dollars, that would be just a crazy use of money.

What's more likely is signaled in the preliminary results of that AoA. We haven’t seen the whole thing, but the Army's early briefing noted that most of the AMPV’s missions would require a vehicle with the off-road mobility of an M2 (just start chanting now: Bradley... Bradley...). Then again, it also said that a wheeled vehicle would suffice for replacing “about 16 percent of the M113 family of vehicles fleet”. Quite a few M113s spend most of their time on roads, and as the procurement of the MRAP Heavily Armored Ground Ambulance (HAGA) showed, the higher road speed of a wheeled vehicle has some utility in certain utility roles (like casualty evacuation).

As there will also be an excess fleet of several thousand MRAPs through which to pick (I'm imagining a new cable show), here's the tough pitch for GDLS to make: spend the money, Army, for a really mobile wheeled vehicle. The Stryker may not be as bomb-proof as any MRAP, but that's not what it optimizes. Honestly, it's hard to describe what the Stryker optimizes, and that's the essence of its appeal. It's a utility infielder of an armored vehicles, doing most things decently, if nothing spectacularly. But if keeping up with the mechanized brigades from the rear is part of the requirement, one can see why a corps commander might want a medical battalion or command group driving in something less likely to stick in the sand. Sure, GDLS has its own MRAP, but the RG31 is actually built by BAE Systems in South Africa (though an old arrangement with one of BAE’s forerunners, GDLS just owns the marketing rights in North America). Moreover, there's no essential advantage that original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) hold across all upgrade work, so a modest MRAP upgrade contract might go to anyone. 

That is a matter that the folks at BAE will need to consider, as well, regarding those utility Bradleys. As they craft their briefing decks, they'll need to explain why that particular OEM has tacit knowledge of the engineering of the vehicles that isn't fully conveyed in the technical data packages (TDPs)—if that's indeed the case. Conversely, an engineering firm—a Mantech or an Excelis, for example—would need to show how it truly could master the TDP. Experience could count for a lot, through past work on Bradleys, or at least demonstrably fast learning in another upgrade program for someone else's vehicle.

For GDLS, though, building new Strykers would obviously be a much bigger contract, and rather more money per vehicle than cutting-and-pasting on a Bradley. It would also be a contract that clearly would be sole-sourced to GDLS. So the choice seems clear.

Anyway, that's my best guess: a few thousand turretless Bradleys, a few hundred doubled-hulled utility Strykers, and a considerable stream of work for at least GDLS. Assuming, of course, that AMPV stays funded, which is a wholly different matter. I will take up that issue in a later post.

Jim +1-512-299-1269 www.jameshasik.com