There has come to be a familiar choreography to NATO-led air campaigns. The events over Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq again, and Libya all unfolded slightly differently, but one can imagine an ideal type to the general narrative. The opening night begins with a fusillade of cruise missiles aimed at radars, radio towers, and anti-aircraft missile batteries. Concurrently, or shortly thereafter, B-2s arrive with dozens of JDAMs, plastering headquarters buildings, airfields, and aircraft hangars. With that path cleared, squadrons of less stealthy fighter-bombers close with laser-guided bombs and infrared missiles to dispatch any tanks and other kit foolishly left in the open. Rinse, repeat. After enough cycles, defenses collapse, or someone throws in the towel.
What's problematic is how widely understood this game plan has become. Substitute "Second Artillery" for NATO's sundry air armadas, and ballistic missiles for Tomahawks and stealth bombers, and we have the makings of the Pentagon's reigning nightmare scenario. For if anyone is worried about the US Navy's ability to keep DF-21Ds from smacking into its carriers, I have this counterpoint. I'm not personally sure of the location of any of the Navy's carriers at any given moment, but from my desk, with Google Earth, I have a pretty good idea of where to find Andersen and Kadena Fields.
Thus, whatever my doubts about the viability of the project, the consistent commitment of several American defense secretaries to the (always) eventual development of a new long-range bomber would, in this context, make sense. But the F-35A just makes for a puzzling commitment. The -A is a CTOL fighter-bomber of unremarkable range, and yet the USAF isn't pouring massive quantities of concrete all over its bases in the Pacific. The Second Artillery, we're recently told, is boring tunnels all over China. One might expect some similar activity on the other side.
Back in December 2005, then-USAF chief of staff General John Jumper did announce that the USAF planned to buy not just F-35As, but STOVL F-35Bs as well. A slightly modified version of the USMC's airplane would be sought for operating closer to the Army ground forces the plane was meant to support. That plan didn't last, but to closeness, on the list of military virtues, I would add survivability. That, after all, was the point of the Harrier force in RAF service, as distinct from that of the Royal Navy.
What, though, does all this have to do with the announcement this week by Defense Secretary Panetta that the F-35B was off the double-secret probation on which his predecessor Bob Gates had placed it? Timing, I should think. After the announcement, I quickly heard the complaint that those lower in the government would lack that Damoclean blade for threatening Lockheed Martin. Perhaps, but Lockheed's admission this very week that its CATOBAR F-35C has failed its initial carrier landing tests has created a whole other burning platform. Ten years after building a prototype, the company has belatedly figured out that the retractable tailhook is badly positioned for snagging arresting wires, and will require a serious redesign. Tom Burbage says that this should not be a problem. Not everyone, it seems, is equally confident—a condition that has seemingly been recurring in the JSF program.
With a whole other fire at Lockheed's feet, it's possible that Leon decided that he could safely signal his interest in the -B model with an endorsement of its technical progress. Whether that's warranted is a question beyond my scope of analysis, but the point of a STOVL airplane in (amongst other places) the western Pacific—this administration avowed area of interest—is obvious. With no evidence that the F-35's price per plane will come down as the production run continues, and no good likelihood of an increase in American military spending, the entire program is in for a serious reduction in quantities. Panetta's announcement effectively sends notice to the specific opponents of the -B model (as opposed to general JSF-haters) that easier fights will be found elsewhere.
With the latest bad news from Fort Worth, it's now entirely possible that the -C model will be the subject of probation. If Lockheed can't fix the problem, appearing so late in the program, the bonanza for Boeing will be profound. For as a friend of mine at NAVAIR related to me recently, there always has been a Plan B for the F-35, whether for the Navy or the Marines, and it rhymes with "Super Hornet".
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