Every October for the past three years, the Marine Corps University at Quantico has hosted a symposium on the work and legacy of John Boyd, the noted American military strategist of the 1970s and 1980s. Boyd is most widely known as the progenitor of the OODA Loop (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act), a notion of military decision-making, or as Boyd would have it, "of learning and appreciation". He's also very notable for his influence on the USMC's strategic culture from roughly the end of the Cold War through today.
Attached, after a number of requests, is my recent paper on the subject. I actually wrote it before last year's symposium, but at the last minute was unable to attend and present. I didn't even present it this year, but word got around, and the paper has generated some buzz and some criticism. In hopes for more of both, I post it below.
As I've said before, I'm neither a fan nor a serious detractor of Boyd. His influence over the USMC alone would make him worthy of study. I uncovered what I considered to be some serious problems with his theories, and thus decided to write.
As always, comments are appreciated, though I recommend Scott Shipman's Boyd-and-Beyond Facebook group as the best forum for those. There's already an active discussion underway there, and some of the commentaries are really good.
Jim +1-512-299-1269 www.jameshasik.com