I have been away from public commentary for almost a month, as I've been extremely busy with both academic and professional work. I seem to be closing with the bottom of the pile, at least for now. Besides, in the past few weeks there has been a flurry of news, on which I must weigh in, about US and Canadian Army troop carriers. The two armies, it seems, are not exactly happy with most of them.
Last month, the US Army announced that the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division, the "Ghost Rider" Strykers of Iraqi fame in 2004, would not be taking those Strykers on their upcoming deployment to Afghanistan. Instead, the troops will draw MRAPs and M-ATVs from the thousands available in country. [1] One can understand the emphasis on blast-protection. When driving Strykers there in 2009, the 5th Brigade of that division suffered 37 killed and 238 wounded; 21 of those killed were lost to IEDs, and at least 40 of the wounded were as well. [2] As varying reports from Iraq and Afghanistan have indicated over the years, there are things the troops love about the LAV, and there are things about which they're clearly less enthused.
This loss rate was thus part of what led to the program to bolster American and Canadian LAV-IIIs with double V-hulls, greater ground clearance, and more powerful engines. The Canadian program includes 550 vehicles, and the government in Ottawa hopes that this will extend the LAV's utility out through 2035. [3] The American program is similar, and has so far has upgraded somewhat more than 300 vehicles from an initial order of 450. Three hundred or so is enough only to equip a single brigade, so another 292 vehicles were ordered from General Dynamics last month, at a total price of $634 million. [4]
At roughly $2.2 million per vehicle, depending on the variant, that price is a far cry from the $10 million that the US Army figures that it would need to pay for each new Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV). That short of the $13 billion that the Government Accountability Office figured that they'd cost, but it's still a whopping number in the face of serious financial constraints. And yet, the Americans are particularly underwhelmed by their Bradleys, the vehicle that the GCV is supposed to replace. The "Bradley is our most attrited vehicle," Lieutenant General Bill Phillips told the House Armed Services Committee last month, "we haven't used them in combat since 2007 or 2008." [5] Phillips is the military deputy to the assistant secretary for acquisition, so he has some visibility into the issue, and some authority on it.
So, the Army will shortly be spending $46 million on an analysis of alternatives (AoA) to determine whether either KMW and Rheinmetall's Puma or Israeli Military Industries Namer could work in place of the GCV. [6] As I have written previously, it's just plausible that the Germans and the Israelis know something about tanks. Frankly, $46 million should pay for a whole lot of AoA-ing, so one does hope that the work produces a usable answer. There are clear advantages to an off-the-shelf purchase, including the political benefit of showing the Army's political masters that it can actually get something right in procurement fast, after a decade of expensive and failed attempts to reinvent wheels. Or tracks.
Who should be expected to benefit, ex ante, in this shift? KMW and Rheinmetall are back in the game with GCV, after losing to BAE Systems and General Dynamics in the first round (even if that contract award is still under protest). But writ larger, GD may be the big winner, and BAE the partial loser. First, the Canadian Army remains committed to its LAVs, and seems sticking that way for some time to come, And even if the US Army isn't sending GD's to Afghanistan, it's still modifying them, and apparently raising an eighth brigade, when it's talking of consolidating other brigades into larger formations, and just cutting a whole lot of battalions.
For BAE's Bradleys, though, the Army is showing little but contempt. BAE may yet get the opportunity to turn some of those Bradleys into turretless utility vehicles as replacements for really, really aged and unbeloved M113s. But for despite earlier interest in an A4 version of the Bradley, that idea has been noticeably absent from recent Army chatter on the subject. More notably, while that Namer that is attracting notice was designed by IMI, it's currently being built by GD—at Lima, Ohio with American military aid funds. So, GD has a hot production line for an Israeli-endorsed GCV alternative that costs about half what a GCV would.
Some of this is fortune and some of this is virtue, but one really must be impressed with the places that GD has staked in the armored vehicle business. They've been paying off handsomely for about a decade now. In short, whether or not the Bradley gets replaced anytime soon, GD is in a great position to benefit.
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PS: In the interests of full disclosure, I'll note that I'm not currently a consultant to any of the firms mentioned in the preceding essay. In general, as I tell people, if you want to know for whom I'm not working, read about whom I'm actually writing.
NOTES
1. Adam Ashton, "Deploying JBLM brigade will leave Strykers behind," Seattle Times, 26 October 2011.
2. "US Army Moves Ahead with V-Hull Strykers," Defense Industry Daily, 30 October 2011.
3. "LAV LORIT—Standardizing Afghan LAV Upgrades," Canadian-American Security Review, 23 October 2011; Elise Stolk, "Federal Government to Spend $1.1 Billion on Combat Vehicles," Edmonton Journal, 21 October 2011.
4. "GDLS to Deliver Double V-Hull Strykers to Equip Two Brigades," Defense Update, 27 October 2011.
5. Philip Ewing, "New Army Optimism on GCV," DoD Buzz, 27 October 2011.
6. Michael Hoffman, "U.S. Army Still Eyeing Puma in GCV's Stead: McHugh," Defense News, 2 November 2011; Brendan McGarry, "U.S. Army May Look to Germany, Israel for Ground Combat Vehicles," Bloomberg, 2 November 2011.
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