Some real numbers on the Stryker's performance in Afghanistan

A colleague this morning asked for any quick comments that I might have on Sara Carter's article in today's Washington Times on the Stryker armored vehicle, the US version of the LAV-III. The title, "Armored troop carriers called unsafe for duty," rather telegraphs its intent. Specifically, he wanted to know whether the article could inform any speculation about what will come of the US Army's armored vehicle recapitalization efforts—or, what comes after FCS.

Here are the facts that Sara presents:

1. Since the 5th Stryker Brigade deployed to southern Afghanistan in July, the formation has lost 21 of its 350 Strykers.
2. In that time, the brigade has also suffered "more than" 12 dead and "nearly" 70 wounded.

The rest of the article is color commentary. Doug MacGregor, for example, calls the Stryker "essentially a paramilitary police vehicle... designed to transfer American light infantry down a road." He also thinks that what troops in Afghanistan most need is "is tracked armor, off-the-road capability and a stable platform for large-caliber guns." That’s entertaining, but unhelpful. To begin, the term "light infantry“ is essentially meaningless: all infantry should move down roads with armored protection. Their alternative conveyance should be trucks? Walking across Afghanistan? I won't comment on Macgregor’s cranky use of the term "paramilitary," but I will note that no evidence is offered concerning the suitability of tanks with heavy guns for counterinsurgency missions. We’ve seen some useful employment in Afghanistan of Danish and Canadian Leopard tanks with their 120 mm guns, but we’ve also seen useful employment there of British Scimitar tanks with their 30 mm guns. Since General Dynamics has built other version of the LAV-III with 25 mm cannons, and showed one with a remote 25 or 30 mm turret at AUSA last month, it’s far from obvious that the right approach can’t ride on wheels.

Also intriguing is how Staff Sgt. Daniel Paul Rabidou of the 1st Infantry likes to call the Stryker a "Kevlar coffin." The Stryker is made of steel; its spall liner is made of Kevlar. Since tanks have been called "steel coffins" with some affection since at least the Second World War, I'm not sure why he would choose to call his ride a Kevlar one. In any case, this is what we call an anecdote, and as is sometimes lost on some journalists, the plural of anecdote is not data.

Rather, let's focus on what we do know, working through those few datums we actually have in this article:

1. Assuming replacements and a constant level of violence, losing 21 of 350 vehicles in six months amounts to an annualized loss rate of 12 percent.
2. Similarly, "more than" 12 dead in a brigade of 3500 troops represents an annual loss rate of "more than" 0.7 percent.

Regarding the 12 percent vehicle loss rate, as a marketer in the business once told me, it’s better to lose auto parts than body parts. For wealthy countries fighting far-off insurgencies, replacing vehicles is far better than replacing people. If the vehicle is destroyed but saves enough of its occupants often enough, then it has done its job.

Now, if we assume that all the fatalities in the brigade occurred inside Stryker vehicles—and that is almost certainly not the case—then the fatality rate exceeds 0.068 dead per vehicle per year. One should only get worked up about this number if it is markedly worse than the alternatives. In October 2006, I published an analysis of fatality rates in US armored vehicles in Iraq during the first three years of counterinsurgency work there. I found these figures:

0.024 per Abrams tank
0.033 per Stryker troop carrier
0.044 per Bradley troop carrier

Note that I am not comparing these rates to those in MRAPs, which have rather lower fatality rates amongst the infantry. Still, we do know from this analysis that the Stryker’s annual fatality rate per vehicle, in this one brigade in southern Afghanistan this year, could conceivably be twice that of comparable to rates in several Stryker brigades fighting in northern Iraq over three earlier years. That would assume, however, that all the fatalities were incurred in the brigade’s Strykers, which again, is almost certainly not the case. By itself, this is not news. We need more data to draw any useful conclusions.

In the interest of full disclosure, I will note that I am not currently undertaking any work for General Dynamics, which makes the Stryker, nor for any other company with a significant part in the program. Rather, I am just looking for answers, but specifically, answers to the right questions. The question here is whether the armor, speed, and situational awareness afforded troops by the Stryker are better or worse than those features afforded by other vehicles. This article doesn’t quite tell us otherwise.

MRAPs, of course, are wholly another matter. The MRAPs that did such great duty in Iraq, of course, were largely meant for urban applications, and Afghanistan is clearly a much more rugged place. That is why the USMC is retrofitting its Cougars in Afghanistan with Oshkosh’s TAK-4 offroad suspension, and why the services together have invested so much in the MRAP All Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) program. They’re seeking roughly the offroad mobility of the Stryker, but with better mine protection.

So, if there is any indication here about what comes after FCS, it’s that any vehicles ordered must feature enough mine protection to seriously complicate road-mining by foot-mobile sappers, who can only carry explosives so large, and enough protection against shaped charges to repeatedly ward off strikes from at least RPG-7s. Separately, I will argue that ballistic protection in excess of 14.5 mm all-around protection at 200 meters in relatively unimportant, since US infantry are not likely to frequently encounter cannon-armed opponents inside missile range. (It’s just that can’t derive that per se from this article.)

At the same time, as much of counterinsurgency is about securing the lines of communications for the populace, the high road speed and low road impact of vehicles like the Stryker or of the MRAP class shouldn’t be discounted. Charging through farmers’ fields with tanks in search of guerrillas does nothing for hearts and little for minds—a point perhaps yet lost on those who spent their careers preparing for the big fight in the Fulda Gap.