Update on the future of the US Army's structure

Last week I wrote a long column about the possible evolution of the US Army’s force structure in this summer’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). To review, the current structure of the Army and the National Guard—at least in their line brigades—looks roughly like this:

type	composition	Army	NG
Heavy	Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles with dismounting infantry and cavalry troops, and Paladin armored howitzers	17	8
Medium	LAV-III Stryker vehicles with dismounting infantry and cavalry troops, and 155 mm towed howitzers	6	1
Light	dismounted infantry, cavalry troops in armored Humvees, towed 105 mm howitzers, and MRAPs when they need them	20	19

The Army is planning to add two more brigades, and it is widely assumed that those will be light formations. I also noted that the QDR would probably call for more Stryker brigades, but wasn’t sure (as I put it) “whether those possible new Stryker brigades will be converted from light or heavy formations.”

The answer now seems fairly clear. Greg Grant reports at DoD Buzz that Chief of Staff General George Casey, while testifying to the conggress last week, was talking up those Stryker brigades on two counts: their LAV-III armored vehicles were performing very well in Iraq, and headquarters loved the large number of dismounted infantry and cavalry troops that they could bring to battle. The general left the question to the QDR as well, but signaled hard that the Army leadership (1) expected more Stryker brigades, and (2) preferred that their number would come from a reduction in the number of heavy brigades.

The general wasn’t specific about how many brigades he expected would be converted, but the plurality of his speech suggests at least two. That would leave the Army in 2013 or so with 15 heavy brigades, 8 Stryker brigades, and 22 light brigades. The loss of two more heavy brigades—if matched in the training and prepositioning equipment sets as well—will cut the reset and upgrade expectations of BAE Systems (with the M2/M3 Bradley and the M109 Paladin) and General Dynamics (with the M1 Abrams) by about 12 percent. That hurts, though not overwhelmingly.

Casey also made clear that those “light” formations would only go in light if they had to. Otherwise, they’d expect to drive into battle in MRAPs. That was to be expected, but it’s an important articulation from the head of the service. At this point, no one should doubt a reasonable future for the MRAPs in US service. For whosever vehicles will be retained in the inventory, that’s good news.

One of the relative advantages of the Stryker brigades is that their vehicles can carry rather heavier weaponry than MRAPs currently do. Since the Stryker brigade can be stiffened by the addition of an independent Abrams tank battalion, and brings its own 105 mm assault guns and anti-tank missile launcher vehicles, it can be expected to perform well against even well-armored opponents. In a sense, the LAV-IIIs nicely bridge the capabilities of vehicles like the Bradley and vehicles of the MRAP type.

That is, they would if they were rather more mine resistant. This gets to the question of just what that freed-up Future Combat System money might buy. Casey also mentioned six factors (even if he didn’t delineate them that way) that add up to a rather altered dynamic of competition amongst prospective contractors:

• New vehicles would be sought in five to seven years.
• The question of wheels versus tracks would be revisited.
• The Army would probably not try to put all vehicles on a common chassis.
• The engine systems would most likely be diesel-electric hybrids.
• Protection from anti-armor weapons (specifically mines) would be much more important this time.
• Several vehicles would need to fit in a C-17 Globemaster III transport plane.

There may be multiple ways to interpret this set of constraints, but to me, it suggests four logical, supporting paths forward:

1. Adaptation of a existing eight-wheeled armored vehicle for the high capacity roles of troop carrier, command vehicle, and ambulance.
2. Use of the MRAP-ATV or JLTV for some reconnaissance and liaison roles.
3. Development of a lighter-weight tank more suited to Third World infrastructure.
4. Dropping the requirement for a tracked howitzer replacement (sorry, Senator Inhofe).

It’s entirely possible that none of this will come to pass, but looking around the world, it’s a familiar pattern.

Regarding artillery, a confluence of factors favors this last point. The last M109A6 was built in 1996, and those vehicles haven’t been driven much—rather at all—in combat in Iraq or Afghanistan. The M777 towed howitzer is performing very well, 120 mm mortars are very suitable for close-in fire support, and the Netfires rockets are showing great promise. After all, the US Marines dropped their self-propelled artillery fleet almost 20 years ago.

Item (3) is rather favored by both the USMC and the British Army. The heavy cannons of Canadian and Danish Leopard tanks have been greatly valued against fortified Taliban positions, but they’ve come with more weight than necessary to ward off most rocket grenades. No reasonable amount of armor, of course, will stop a top-attacking anti-tank missile, so the whole protection calculation might be rethought.

Items (1) and (2) are largely where the French Army is headed, in replacing its AMX-10Ps with eight-wheeled VBCIs, but retaining tracks for the tanks. For the high capacity roles, there’s a wide range of candidates—GD’s LAV series, ARTEC’s Boxer, Patria’s AMV, and Nexter’s VBCI might all be considered. Can’t imagine the US Army buying a vehicle designed in France? Why not? It’s already buying the helicopter.