We are dispatching to a distribution list throughout the business a further viewpoint on what lies ahead for the industry in the rest of 2009, and beyond. This paper goes by the title
THE END OF FORCE STRUCTURE
Relevance, responsiveness, rapid learning, and the renewal of entrepreneurship in military contracting
As we see it, recent announcements in the US and the UK regarding the rebalancing of military spending priorities reflect broad and ongoing evolutionary change in the demand for military forces. The familiar scenarios for which force structures had long been planned are giving way to actual preparation for the messy, distant, persistent, small wars of the 21st century. Indeed, the very construct of force structure is giving way to force generation as the dominant paradigm of planning.
This new focus on supporting forces in the field, rather than force structures in garrison, is leading to three broad changes in military-industrial planning. In investment strategy, capital expenditure is giving way to the relevance of operating expenditure; in industrial strategy, capacity is increasingly less valued than responsiveness; and in technology strategy, long cycle innovation is yielding to the rapid learning of short cycle innovation.
In this new, more dynamic environment, entrepreneurial suppliers can succeed by tapping into the information streams of logistics and training markets, by tackling aftermarkets with the same gusto as serial production, and by embracing engineering and product development as their best bet for finding an inimitable capability. The result will be customer needs that are met before they are stated, and defensible profit margins for the forward thinking. Fortis fortuna adiuvat.
The full, 11-page paper is attached as a PDF file for download.
This effort is, if you have been following, the second in a series of papers developed in a research project that I started with some colleagues in early 2008 on the qualities arms makers will need to succeed as their customers in defense ministries undertake messy small wars around the sketchier parts of the globe. One of our colleagues had this to commentary to offer (I have slightly edited the text):
———
I really like this. Very insightful.
I accept what you demonstrate and appreciate your arguments. I have now moved on to try and figure out what the “hybrid” approach looks like. After all, some (though not all) of the emergent technologies, systems, etc. will find themselves based on existing platforms, and some of those platforms will in fact require capital investment, some years in development, etc. For instance, we are installing BMD systems on Burkes, but that was likely not thought of at the outset in the late 1970s. However, in order to do this, accomplish this mission, retrofit the system, you have to have the system in the first place, and the Burke is arguable a very, very good system. The P-8A will be a good system, but it required a 737 platform that itself took capital, some years in development, etc. to make this a possibility today.
So the simple answer is you need modular, scalable systems. OK, that’s buzz-word compliant, but it will be important to really understand what this means, and perhaps to understand and plan for not the force structure, but the loose platform requirements that may be necessary to support the innovation in systems that will then populate that platform for years to come? And there will be some platforms that just come along and innovate themselves (ie, Predator / Warrior / Reaper / Avenger).
———
I agree. We are moving on to help enterprises discover the mechanics of those hybrid approaches.
Comments