Towards a long-term demand model for the tools of counterinsurgency

The headquarters of General David McKiernan’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan recently sent a very brief, unclassified version of its campaign strategy to the well-regarded Small Wars Journal. Therein, the staff offers the following “key planning factors” (expanded slightly for clarity), which may be taken as how the general plans to wage war:

• [It’s a] counterinsurgency campaign [not a peacekeeping mission.]
• Shape, in order to clear, in order to hold and build.
• Prioritize the areas to clear and hold.
• Establish and maintain freedom of movement.
• Apply greater effort on the narcotics-insurgency nexus.
• Identify and engage key Afghan community leaders.
• Interdict and disrupt insurgent movement to and from sanctuaries in the border region.
• Build Afghan capability, capacity, and credibility.

Just about all of these planning factors demand a lot of good foot soldiers, in some proportion of infantry, commandos, and gendarmes. That, and the list itself, are not remarkable to anyone who has spent time studying classic approaches to counterinsurgency. As such, it is not quite controversial, even if other recent articulations of US counterinsurgency strategy have drawn detractions.

What may be remarkable, though, is what these factors imply for material requirements. Preparing for the campaign in Afghanistan is not preparing for any given war, but it is, to use the British term these days, the war. To maintain freedom of movement requires at least two things (items 1 & 2 below). A third flows logically from the needs both to disrupt insurgent movement and to hold and build. A fourth is essential both to engage key leaders and to build Afghan capability:

1. off-road armored vehicles that can handle the Kalashnikov, the rocket grenade, and the mine
2. rotorcraft for high and hot environments
3. light combat aircraft for persistent surveillance and precision strike
4. a lot of Pashto and Dari lessons

This is not to say that every other area should expect a shrinking budget, but the emphasis here does not bode well for the top line of military research, development, and procurement spending. The proposed “MRAP all terrain vehicle” will doubtfully cost nearly as much as a Bradley fighting vehicle. The USAF’s 2009 budget requested more unmanned than manned aircraft, but the former segment soaks up much less cash. Helicopter recapitalization will continue to be a priority, as the shortage of rotorcraft in Afghanistan has been a huge bone of contention amongst the governments supplying troops there. And seven years into the campaign, it’s almost scandalous the paucity of language skills amongst the troops deploying to that country.

In short, while there are other growth areas today, these are the obvious ones. If you’re in the business, and you’re not in these, you should have a good plan. That’s a long way from a long-term demand model, but we’re definitely working on the parameters.