James Hasik

Senator Hutchison, call your office—Some thoughts on the immediate need for another BRAC

In response to the call by US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta for another two rounds of the Base Realignment And Closure (BRAC) process, Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-Texas) released last Thursday the following to the press:

I am strongly opposed to another BRAC round. It is simply premature to assess our requirements for domestic installations until we have made cuts in the large number of overseas bases. Moreover, the Pentagon does not need a BRAC or Congressional authority to close unnecessary overseas bases. Given our troubling economic situation, Secretary Panetta should immediately take action to dramatically reduce our military presence overseas, close bases and return those forces to America, where they can better train and deploy and be closer to their families.

I also remain very concerned that the Administration's planned cuts of approximately 100,000 soldiers and Marines will leave our nation vulnerable. This changes America's defense policy to only prepare for the eventuality of one major conflict. So, if a strong enemy sees our troop strength committed to one area, it leaves us at risk for a strike in another region.

The investments made in our largest Army bases—such as Fort Bliss, Fort Hood, and Fort Bragg—have built maneuver space, ranges, combined arms training opportunities, and rapid deployment capabilities that are not available at any foreign bases. These capabilities are unique to America because of the size of these bases. It is in the best interests of the Army and our national security that we continue to make the best use of these important domestic installations and never signal to our enemies that we can fight only one major regional conflict at a time.

There have been lots of tirades about another BRAC or two in the past week; I'm picking on Kay Bailey most out of proximity (I'm a Texan), and because her remarks bear either a contradiction or a salient view of American security. Let me summarize her position with a few statements:

1. If the US cuts 100,000 ground troops, then it will need to base those troops more centrally, for more flexibility in responding to an attack on an ally somewhere.
2. This means closing bases overseas in preference to closing bases in the US.
3. The secretary doesn't need congressional authority to shutter bases overseas, so he should do this first, particularly in places where troops serve unaccompanied tours.

If one buys the argument of a centralized, rapidly-deploying force (a 'rapid deployment force'? yeesh), then this sound appealing. It gets more interesting when one considers where those unaccompanied tours are—mostly in South Korea and the Middle East. So, it sounds like the senator is saying that the Army ought to pull its brigades out of more than just Germany, where their continued presence is even harder to justify. I truly wonder whether that's what she meant.

In the interests of full disclosure, I will note that I spent much of 2005 as an adviser on the BRAC process, helping companies figure out what would be good or bad for them about particular potential decisions, whether they should lobby for them, and how they could prepare for or react to them. So, more BRAC rounds would be good for business. But I will argue that two more would be exceptionally good for federal finances, which remain disastrously unbalanced.

The excess is obvious. Consider the US Air Force, which is arguably the service whose infrastructure exceeds its needs by the widest margin. The USAF has retired about 500 aircraft in the past decade, and is now planning to cut another 65 C-130s, 27 C-5As, 24 F-16s, 120 A-10s, and its entire fleet of C-27Js. How could it possibly still need all the ramp space that it forecast, back in 2005, that it would still need? It can't, and if the USAF doesn't close bases, it's paying for towers, hangars, warehouses, and gate guards that it just doesn't need. In short, its overhead (nasty word that) will increase in proportion to its warfighting capacity. Now which congressman wants to defend that?

Thus, I'm not looking for Mr. Panetta to close foreign bases first, and then sort out what to do in the US. Things are bad enough that his people ought to be making lists all over the world, and submitting them simultaneously: this is what we'll do overseas regardless, and this is what we want a commission's authority to do here at home.

On the timing of Leon Panetta's announcement regarding the F-35B

There has come to be a familiar choreography to NATO-led air campaigns. The events over Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq again, and Libya all unfolded slightly differently, but one can imagine an ideal type to the general narrative. The opening night begins with a fusillade of cruise missiles aimed at radars, radio towers, and anti-aircraft missile batteries. Concurrently, or shortly thereafter, B-2s arrive with dozens of JDAMs, plastering headquarters buildings, airfields, and aircraft hangars. With that path cleared, squadrons of less stealthy fighter-bombers close with laser-guided bombs and infrared missiles to dispatch any tanks and other kit foolishly left in the open. Rinse, repeat. After enough cycles, defenses collapse, or someone throws in the towel.

What's problematic is how widely understood this game plan has become. Substitute "Second Artillery" for NATO's sundry air armadas, and ballistic missiles for Tomahawks and stealth bombers, and we have the makings of the Pentagon's reigning nightmare scenario. For if anyone is worried about the US Navy's ability to keep DF-21Ds from smacking into its carriers, I have this counterpoint. I'm not personally sure of the location of any of the Navy's carriers at any given moment, but from my desk, with Google Earth, I have a pretty good idea of where to find Andersen and Kadena Fields.

Thus, whatever my doubts about the viability of the project, the consistent commitment of several American defense secretaries to the (always) eventual development of a new long-range bomber would, in this context, make sense. But the F-35A just makes for a puzzling commitment. The -A is a CTOL fighter-bomber of unremarkable range, and yet the USAF isn't pouring massive quantities of concrete all over its bases in the Pacific. The Second Artillery, we're recently told, is boring tunnels all over China. One might expect some similar activity on the other side.

Back in December 2005, then-USAF chief of staff General John Jumper did announce that the USAF planned to buy not just F-35As, but STOVL F-35Bs as well. A slightly modified version of the USMC's airplane would be sought for operating closer to the Army ground forces the plane was meant to support. That plan didn't last, but to closeness, on the list of military virtues, I would add survivability. That, after all, was the point of the Harrier force in RAF service, as distinct from that of the Royal Navy.

What, though, does all this have to do with the announcement this week by Defense Secretary Panetta that the F-35B was off the double-secret probation on which his predecessor Bob Gates had placed it? Timing, I should think. After the announcement, I quickly heard the complaint that those lower in the government would lack that Damoclean blade for threatening Lockheed Martin. Perhaps, but Lockheed's admission this very week that its CATOBAR F-35C has failed its initial carrier landing tests has created a whole other burning platform. Ten years after building a prototype, the company has belatedly figured out that the retractable tailhook is badly positioned for snagging arresting wires, and will require a serious redesign. Tom Burbage says that this should not be a problem. Not everyone, it seems, is equally confident—a condition that has seemingly been recurring in the JSF program.

With a whole other fire at Lockheed's feet, it's possible that Leon decided that he could safely signal his interest in the -B model with an endorsement of its technical progress. Whether that's warranted is a question beyond my scope of analysis, but the point of a STOVL airplane in (amongst other places) the western Pacific—this administration avowed area of interest—is obvious. With no evidence that the F-35's price per plane will come down as the production run continues, and no good likelihood of an increase in American military spending, the entire program is in for a serious reduction in quantities. Panetta's announcement effectively sends notice to the specific opponents of the -B model (as opposed to general JSF-haters) that easier fights will be found elsewhere.

With the latest bad news from Fort Worth, it's now entirely possible that the -C model will be the subject of probation. If Lockheed can't fix the problem, appearing so late in the program, the bonanza for Boeing will be profound. For as a friend of mine at NAVAIR related to me recently, there always has been a Plan B for the F-35, whether for the Navy or the Marines, and it rhymes with "Super Hornet".

Defense barrier, or just desperation in Kansas?

I assert today that the Wall Street Journal, normally really on top of things, has blown its story about Hawker-Beechcraft's lawsuit against the USAF over its selection of Embraer's A-29 Super Tucano as a counterinsurgent attack aircraft. Here' s how the thing starts:

Brazilian-based aircraft manufacturer Embraer SA won an important victory in late December, when the U.S. Air Force picked one of its planes to equip Afghanistan's military. But Embraer's foothold in the U.S. defense market is now in question: rival Hawker Beechcraft Corp. is fighting in court to keep the Air Force from moving forward with the project. Defense analysts and observers say the legal tussle over the warplanes underscores how difficult it can be for foreign-based firms to crack the U.S. military market.

The emphasis, of course, is mine; the article does nothing to make that point. It definitely cites some smart and well-respected people (Richard Aboulafia, David Berteau, etc.) on how getting a foothold with US military customers is difficult. It certainly can be, but the article does not even attempt to connect that matter to the lawsuit. Had Boeing won this contract with, say, a new version of the (A)OV-10 Bronco, Hawker would or would not have still had grounds to sue, but purely on the issue of its exclusion. The domicile of the winning contractor is not at issue.

Now, it's possible that Hawker will, in its arguments to the public at large, throw up some canard (as the folks at Boeing did against Airbus in the tanker competition) about American jobs. As Embraer (like Airbus) is offering to build the airplanes in the US, that would be pretty much nonsense. Hawker Beechcraft is indeed in bad financial straits, whatever its success recently selling more King Airs to armed forces everywhere, as that's not quite enough to sustain the company. So the lawsuit is not a shocking business strategy. We've seen enough of the same from Eastman-Kodak in the last few months to recognize what's going on.

I don't expect that the lawsuit will succeed, as American courts (outside of those loonies on the Ninth Circuit) have generally been loathe to substitute their legal opinions for military judgment. What's more annoying is that the USAF is putting up with it, issuing a stop-work order. In the article, a spokesman for Embraer and Sierra Nevada (its American partner) notes that a ruling isn't expected until March. That's two months more without planes that are presumably needed on the front lines. That's two months more of somebodies possibly getting killed fighting the Taliban because of a lawsuit. This wasn't the sort of thing that was tolerated in the 1940s, so it's mystifying why it should be tolerated now.